Rough Trade by Bhagwati, Jagdish N.
in the studio, and every time he sees
Tharp try "to move on too quickly, leav-
ing a loose end or taking an easy solu-
tion," he shakes his head, and she goes
back to the labor Tor bard-won perfec-
tion. Yet ironi all we now know about the
wiiy Balancbiiu- worked, iliis was exactly
what he never did. He was not a perfec-
tionist in this way. He worked quickly,
left lots of loose ends, and went back
later, confident that he could tie
them tip. Tharp's BalanclnnL- sounds
like soniet)(Klv else^eiomc Robbins.
maybe, or Tharp's mother. But it doesn't
matter whether Tharp goi Balanchine
right in ber lantasy of him. What matters
i.s that she gives us a real insigJu into her
frame of mind.
Oversimpliiitation of motives makes
the txjok's ending unbelievable:
Finally [in "The Men's Piece"! I can tell
thai my aitenipis to discover iriith ihrougli
Cibjective distance have linked up with mv
pui, bringing my ft-flings into focus, allow-
ing my owTi pa«ion lo flow into my clas.sital
forms. U-tling the anger uniiy with tbe
l^ratilude. i have made one danre, noi two.
I will contimir to learn, but tlie apprentice-
sliip is over. Finally i can Teet I bave caught
upwithnu^lf.
Living people don't experience feel-
ings in sentences that begin with
"finally." Only characters in books—in
mediocre book.s—experience feelings
that way. Tharp tells us that she has
reached a new, freeing psychic level, but
her language is telling us thai she is in
chains.
Consider Avedon's thoroughly un-
spontaneous head shot of Tharp on the
dust jacket, in an attitude iliai recalls
publicity phoios of Audrey Hepburn,
and compare it with the fjassage iti
Pinh Comes lo Shmw in whicti Tharp
describes what she claims to be the
moment in her life of greatest vision
anil joy, "Wliile wot king on "Tlie Fugtic'
I also macie The One Hundreds,' a
dance 1 simply and modestly designed
to represent the entire universe," she
begins:
The idea came on a sunny spring afUr-
noon. ' was lvinj^  on a hill; bt'fs biiz/fd
about pocket.si'twiififlowtTN: A single bird's
call pierced every now and iheii tliroiigh
tluT general cacophony; tlie grass and net-
tles bri-stled up; the clouds moved swiftly. 1
saw this marvelous mix of sinell, texture,
iiioveintrnt, sound and loucb—feeling my
bean beating, and imagining I ccjuld feel
my baby's heaj I beating loo—all this dense
completeness of'(jod's creatioti icllccted in
i>i;e theatrical moment: One bundred peo-
ple wotUd fill a ica.sonably si/ed space with
one hundred dilferent and carefully
cr.ifted eleven-second phriises. in and oui,
or. and off. in eit'\'eu seconds, sinniltaiie-
oiisly grand and btmible. As I worked,
choreographing tbese two pieces in a great
rusb, my life was more balanced thau ever
before—my happiness was (oinplete. I bad
a maj'riagf tbat worked, a child on the way
and work \ cared ab<jut deeply, wbicli I
developed with a community' of loyal and
talented friends, \otbing was missing. For
me, life, love and work (Tcled back and
forth in a bealiliy flow. For a few brief
montbs, in ihe spring anfl summer of 1970,
I truly bad it all.
This is a heartbreaking paragraph. Its
very lack of glamor cninpels belie!', SLill.
to believe Tharp IKTC is to disbelieve- the
way that she presents the inside of her-
self elsewhere. In this atitobiography, as
in her career, she tries to have ii all: hap-
piness, tragedy, ingentious wonder,
jaded wisdom, the farm, the city, the
glamor that distances and the warmLh
that closes distances. The range of her
amliition is admirable. Yet its embodi-
meiii lias no integrity. The woman in the
paragraph and the woman on the dust
jacket remain divorced. Tharp the star
atid Thitfp Lhc lutman being also remain
unintegraLed. The writer turn,s otit to be
the star's worst enemy—moving too
quickly, leading loose ends and taking
easy .solutions to her goals. This book is
one piojcct in which Tharp teaily
needed the tiian in tlie chair in the attic,
and it is one project in which, somehow,
she let him go.





Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries
by Laura D'Andrea Tyson
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L aura Tvson. ihe chief ofPresident Clinton's Councilof EcoTiiiinic Advisers, isanythitig l)ttt tmcontnner-
sial- Shr is also immensely smart. Her
economist critics err when they cite her
lack of academic distinction telative to
their own as evidence of folly in ihe pres-
ident's choice.
And yei good policy jttdgment come.s
in two varieties. You recognize it in oth-
t-rs when they reach coiic!usi(ms identi-
cal tt> yotti" own. or when they perstiade
you to change yours. U i.s not a (juality
that many economists have, but it is
desirable, certainlv, in the president's
chief economist. Unforttmately. if l.attra
Tyson's new book on trade policy is any
gtiide, theie iscau.se [bi concetn.
The book displays a certain political
skill. Tyson hedges by describing herself
as a "cautious activist," and by making
accommodating noises to keep critics at
bay. Still, for all her disarming and dis-
claiming, her economic views emerge all
ton clearly. Tyson woitld overturn ihe
basic premises of our postivar traditig
policies. And her arguments fail to pc t-
sttade.
Concentrating oti "high-tech" indus-
tries, Tyson declares hci self in favor of
three kinds of government action to
help these indtistries: first, selective sub-
sidies; second, the use of "aggt essive uni-
lateralism" in the form of threats to close
our tnarkets and to pry open foreign
tnatkets that wf tmilatei-ally judge to be
closed to us ttnfairly; and third, a resort
to "managed trade." which economists
define as the .setting of restrictive quotas
on impotts and targets to expand ex-
ports, Tyson choosing the latter.
AH of this she tirges with "caution."
and under "appropriate'" conditions. But
these policies would ttndermitie. for a
sizable and growing segment of world
trade, the curretit internatiotial trading
system. Under that system, the use of
subsidies bas been increasingly con-
strained. New trade obligations have
been established through reciprocal
conce.ssions rather than thtougli tising
intitnidalion to extract one-way conces-
sions; and the trend is towaici settling
uade di.sputes in impartial multilat-
eral tribunals. Moreover, managed or
"cfsult.s-oriented" trade, where bureau-
crats fix quantities to be traded, has
increasingly given way to "rtiles-based"
trade, where the qttantities traded reflect
cnnipetition. just as in a game it is the
rules that are Mxed and tiot the final
score.
Fearing Tyson's beliefs, which they
have gleaned mostly from her rcptitadon
for being "against ftce trade" rather than
from a close reading of her work,
economists have reacted in two defen-
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sive ways. Heibcri Stein, a former chair-
man of the Council of Econoiiiic Adws-
ers, let his hopes u iunipli over his expec-
tations, and in The Wall Street Journal he
predicted tliat Tyson w<nild return to the
fold. Robert Barrt» of Harvard Univer-
sity, in the same newspaper, took an out-
landish line: it did not matter who ran
the Cotincil of Economic Advisers, since
It influenced nothing.
B ut such reassurances willnot suffice. Tyson is a pow-erful figure now. and asher hook makes clear, she
has an agenda. Indeed, the most likely
explanation for Tyson's appointment is
the most obvious one: the president
finds that her views broadly coincide
with his own. (The president's unre-
hearsed statements on trade policy at his
first press conference only conHrmed
this impression.) The importance of
high-tech indtistries and the need lo
promote them in all necessary ways:
these appear to be home truths that only
impractical "theorists," who are out of
touch witli "reality," ignore. Few politi-
cians remember, of course, ihai com-
mon sense is precisely the qualit)' that
makes people assert that the earth is llat,
since that is how it appears to ihe naked
eye.
The president can also be expected to
be respon.si\'e to the high-tech executives
who flocked around him during the
campaign. Aiid a president who won the
campaign preaching an exaggerated
message oi economic decline will be w\\-
nerable to economists who can equate
high-tech special pleading with socialiy
desirable policy. Tyson certainly plays
that ttnie. The policy program of her
book rests on the Ibllowing logic. High-
tech industries are more important than
others: international trade and competi-
tion in them are skewed, becatise our
trading rivals intervene more heavily
than we do; when others intervene to
help their high-tech industries, we must
intervene, too; and the appropriate poli-
cies include stibsidies, trade retaliation
and managed trade.
Each of these assertions is uncon-
vincing at best, flawed at worsi. Con-
sider, first, her infatuation with high-
technology industry. Being high-tech is
populai'ly thought to be synonymous
with (xctip\ing the high grtnmd; making
semiconductor chips is better than mak-
ing potato chips, as Clyde Prestowitz put
it. Ross Perot loved Prestowitz's motto so
much that he used ii in the presidential
debate. And Bill CHinton found Presto-
witz's support so important that he cited
it in the final debate as proof of his own
Silicon Valley virtue. And yet, for all
these endorsements, and Tyson's, the
arginnent is shallow.
ihe definition of high-tech industry,
for a start, is nuicli too nebtilous for pur-
poses of policy. One favored criterion is
ahove-average spending on lesearch and
development: hut there are different
ways of defining averages, and ihc
period over which you calculate the a\'er-
age will yield different groups of high-
tech industries. ,\Jso, if yott think high-
tech meims using advanced techno-
logical know-how and highly skilled
labor, then you ma)' be in for some stir-
prises. Michael Schrage has written in
the Los Angfh's Timr^ aboui how potato
chips are actually made by Pepsi Co."s
Frito-Lay subsidiary. It turns out that
those giiys are not slotiches chewing
tobacco on an assembly line that has
seen no changes since Chaplin's days.
Potato chips are made by pretty sophisti-
cated technology these days.
P restowitz has dearly bitten(iff more than he canmunch; and so has Tyson.It is also not enough to say.
as Tyson does, that R&D has henetlcial
spillovers foi" society at laige, and that
economists agree that those spillovers
aie often tincompensated. At best,
that argues only for a general, rather
than industry-specific, subsidy for
research and development. Tyson is also
guilty oi' concentrating only on RScVt in
manufactures as a source of tmcompen-
sateci spillover effects. But don't doctors
earn less than the happiness they pro-
vide simply by heing accessible when
you fall sick? Banks provide valti-
able infrastructtire: Is this reflected in
their profits? Are teachers' salaries a
meastire of their true worth? If I had to
hazard an informed gtiess, I would say
that services are at least as prone on the
average as manufactures to yield
uncompensated spillover effects, maybe
more.
But Tyson wants to make a very spe-
cific case for singling otit particular
industries for stipport. She argues that
certain high-tech industries have greater
cachet in creating uncompensated exter-
nalities than do industries not on her
list, and are therefore deserving of gov-
ernmental support. Btit she does not
bother to look at the evidence, sparse as
it is, on where the uncompensated exter-
nalities are, and whether they corre-
spond to her pecking order of favored
indtistries. The economist Edward Man.s-
field did careful work on the returns
from seventeen industrial inncnaLiotis,
and he fovmd that the highest discrep-
ancy between social and private retiuiis
from innovation was in "thread innova-
tion" and then in "stain removers," nei-
ther of which would rank high on a high-
tech list, or even appear on such a list al
all. Besides, these discrepancies are so
different across industries, and so diffi-
cult to predict, that selecting any one
indtisti-y, or any one bunch of industries,
for prior support is nothing more than
an act oi' faith. The c-mpirical b;isis for
such a selection is shaky indeed.
U nless Tyson has a crystalball and can plausiblyforesee, which she cannot,which industries are most
deserving of a subsidy, we nuist stick to
tiix breaks for al! R&tJ. Ii is a policy
ahout which we may agree, since all
we call tell for sure is that R&D in gen-
era! turns out to have a social rate of
return that vastly exceeds its private
rate of return. This may favor the
"high-tech" industries on Tyson's list.
But it may not, since "over the last
decade, the ten ... industries classified
as high-technolog)' industries by the
U.S. Depariment o( Commerce funded
neaily 60 percent of private industrial
R&D in the United States." That more
than 40 percent of American R&D is
funded by non-high-tech industries sug-
gests that the net effect of a general R&D
subsidy may well be to pull resources to
the.se industries rather than to Tyson's
preferred ones. .\nd this would likely be
the better outcome.
Moreover, recenl research by the
economists David Dollar and Edward
Wolff has shown that Japan's particular
industries, incltiding high-tech indus-
Uies. "emphatically" coiuiihute nothing
to explaining whyjapan's aggregate pit>-
ducti\ ity has been catching up with ours.
.-Utliough "much of the American obses-
sion with Japan arises from that coun-
try's success in some highly visible
[mostly high-tech] lines: automobiles,
television, \*t.Rs and computeis," they
conclude that "Japan caught up with the
United States becatise its relative pro-
ductivity increased in every industry."
The same basic result liolds (or other
OECD countries, and therefore "there is
not some key iiidtistry or product line
that has to be captured as the means to
economic success."
I suspect that the pi-eference Ibr com-
puter chips over potato chips is, in the
end, also a form of quasi-Mai xist techno-
logical deter mi ni.sni. Surely it is not what
you produce that determines what you
are; il is what you do with yourself. You
could be prodticing semiconductor
chips, fitting boards mindle.ssly, export-
ing them in order to import potato
chips, eating tliein as you watch televi-
sion and tttrning into a society of
morons. Alternatively, you could be pro
ducing potato chips with advanced tech-
nology, exporting them to import semi-
conductor chips embedded in I'.c.s that
you use imaginatively to improve your-
self, turning into a society of creative cit-
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izens. It is the "fundamentals," your edu-
cation and your aspiration, that fmally
matter, not vour work station and your
industry.
P roceeding from theunproved premise thai thehigh-tech industries niiislbe preferred, Tyson argiies
tliat we are siuing by idly while others
intervene sensibly to seduce high-tech to
iheir shores. Why do we tic our hands
while others fightr Partly because we
refuse lo admit that others do fight; and
partly because we subscrihe to the
defunct doctrine of free trade, turning
the other check.
Tyson's contention that others fighi
and we don't rests on case studies that
are selective; they do not reflect an unbi-
ased sample. Stnc enotigh.. Motorola
pagers had a difficult time breaking into
Japan, and the European airhus was &u\>
sidized with dogged determination. But
you would not know from Tyson lliat the
Japanese government's subsidies for pri-
vate sector R&n. for example, are no
more than si billion annually, rimning
at about 3 percent of the s'M) billion in
RJtn .subsidies di.spcnsed t() private com-
panies by our goMrrnnieni. Indeed, as
GarySaxonhouse liasnoiccl, onr govern-
ment spends far more, in absolute and
proportional terms, than Japan's on
civilian R&O even when otir defense-
related expenditures are ignored.
The selectivii) ol' Tyson's empirical
research is also evident in her discussion
of the complex issue of Japan's "closed"
markets. Tvson cites onlv those who
favor her own position, ignoring ihe
work of Saxonhouse and Rol)t'ri Stern,
who have shown that Japan's average tar-
iffs and nontariff bairiers have fallen to
negligible levels, perhaps even to levels
lower than ours. Indeed, in mantitac-
tures, our extensive use ot* voluntary
export restraints (for example, on
Japanese autos) and our resort to anti-
dumping actions, given Japan's \irtiial
self-denial of these protectionist devices,
put our manufacUiring protection welt
ahead of theirs.
The debate has shifted, therefore, to
"structurai" barriers in Japan's market.
To tuiderstand this issue, recall the
Tarzan movies of your childhood. The
Jungle may be closed to you because the
natives, led by the chief, are shooting
poisoned arrows ai you. Bin H" they are
not, and the jungle is open (and inviting
because of the gold that it promises), the
progress of the safari throtigli the jungle
is constrained hv the tall grass and the
thick vegetation. Then again, the path
through the jungle is hazarclotis because
of the dangers posed by irajis. laid by
natives Lo hunt animals but inaflvertcntly
dangerous lo tlie salaii as well. In shori.
openness and pencirability are different
things.
The focus of the debate about Japan
has now shifted lrom openness to pene-
trability, even ihough poliiicians and
sloppy economists continue to lalk of
Japan's "closed" markei. Is the penetra-
bility of tiic Japanese market for maiut-
factures unustially low? Attempts at pnn'-
ing that Japan is impenetrable are a
growth industry in the high-tech eco-
nomics sector, but it is the rare study iliat
is not in dispute. 1 he most cogent analy-
ses have been directed at showing how
Japan's keirHxus (or close-knit busint-ss
groups) reduce imports from abroad by
buying pieferentially lrom their own
domestic suppliers. But even these stud-
ies run into sedotis concepuial prolv
lems. Keiretsus are informal groupings,
and hence hard to work into siatisti{ a!
analysis. They come in many different
varieties. Moreover, vertical kein'Isus
(ctosciv linked stippliers and users) are
only an informal counlerpart of verti-
cally integrated companies, far more
common here. Do we complain about
[BM making its own semiconductor chips
(and hence preventing Hitachi from .sell-
ing them to ttiM by "denving access"), or
aboiu (ieiieral Motors, which produces
more than ~r> percent of its y)arts itself
(while thf sliare oi the average iu-hou.se
prodtictlon of parts in Japanese atito
plants is closer to 25 percent)? Indeed,
some of the same factors that encourage
cio.se supplier relationships among firms
there stimtilatc vertical iiuegration here.
Can the same thing be bad in Japan and
good in Amei ica?
T o be surf, those who Ihulothers to be competingunfairly rarely examine[heir own backyard. It i--
not jusi ihat similai loadblocks (im
obtain ai I>oth ends. Rather, what ur
consider lo be perfcttly reasonable
given otir culture and om' hisLorv. will
often present obstacles to others wlut
evolved differently. If the safari finds tin
jungle diflicult to penetrate, the cit-bin
of the Plarl of Greystoke in f.ondoii and
the entry of Grocodik- Dtuidee inui Ne\\
York were no walkover, eitlier. Ihink ol
how the older^eneration Japanese inn>i
have struggled lo get a tocliold in our
markets, which presetued both periU
and opportunities: the Knglisfi language
was an imposing barrier to enuy. and
residues ot racism were widespread.
Tyson ignores all sucli conipliciUions
of perspective, advocating thai the
L'nitcd States respond head-to-bcad,
matching each plov with a ploy of our
own. As the ('linton campaign promised
in Pultitifi; h-nple First, if tlit-y do not play
by our rtrles, we will play by tbeirs. Tyson
suggests that this "eye for an eye"
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respoii.sc has been iiihibitftl in ihc
United States by the doctrine of unilat-
eral free trade, now defunct because of a
"new" theory of trade. She errs. We have
never been iniilateial free traders. The
"old" theory of trade allows amply for
shared embrace of free trade. The C.ATT,
designed and supported by the most dis-
tinguished free traders of the postwar
generation of international economists.
is premised on the muliiality of trade
ohligations and concessions. The rea-
sons for not going ak)ng with Tyson's
prescriptions are far more complex and
nuanced than mere reflexive commit-
ment to unilateral free trade.
T bf lament that our maiketsare open when others areclosed has its flip side inthe cui'rent self-indulgent
view dial we have been alU'tiists in our
trade policy, giving concessions that are
not matched by those we receive. This
belief does not sit well with the facts.
Unlike nineteenth-century Britain, with
its passionale conimitnient lo unilateral
free trade, we have generally insisted on
reclp3"ocity of concessions. Even the
Tiade Act of 19;14. M'hich began tiadf
liberalization after the disastrous Smoot-
Hawley Tariff of 1930, has the word
"reciprocal" in its title. Wliat we did in
the postwar period was to provide lead-
ership in creating and sustaining a GATT-
based multilateral trading system,
geared to opening markets ihiough suc-
cessive rounds of negotiations. But yoti
can lead wntiioul being altruistic. In xiv-
tually all rounds (except tlie very earli-
est, when the others were prostrate after
the war), we collected as much as we
gave.
It is also incorrect to asseri ihal free
traders have generally been unilateralists
because that is what ihe "old" trade the-
ory of Adam Smith taught them. Yes, we
do teach our students that if others
harm themselves and us through trade
harriers, that is no reason to compound
the damage by erecting our own. As Joan
Robinson used to say. if others throw
rocks into their hai'bor, why ihrow rocks
into your own? Utit ihen ^^ 'e also know-
that Adam Smith had clearly advanced
the argiunent that there are times when
we may usefully threaten to impose tar-
iffs to get others to remove theirs. You
may be able to throw rocks at others and
thereby to force them to dredge up the
ones they have thrown into their own
harbor.
Cosmopolitan free traders also have
ai'gued for symmetry of free irade obli-
gations. 1 might gain if you subsidize and
cheapen the goods that I import; but
your .subsidy distorts the incentives shap-
ing the allocation of activity among
different nations. Cosmopolitan free
traders prefer free trade for all to unilat-
eral free irade by oneself, just as one may
gain by receiving stolen property but
object to doing so because ol the effect
that would have on the system at large.
In iact. the (;ATT, overseeing world uade
since 1947 and now lOH nations strong,
embodies precisely tliese "systemic"
views of free trade. In both trade obliga-
tions iind concessions, the institution
seeks svTnmetry and reciprocity.
T yson, then, need not fearfiee tjaders. Few freetraders are for unilateraldisarmament. But they
need fear her. For she goes well beyond
the suspension of belief in unilateral
free trade to embrace aggressive tmilat-
cralism against our rivals. She endorses
otir tise of (even c.vn-illegal) tariffs
against counu'ies whom we ha '^e unilat-
erally decided are "imfairly" competing
with us; she wants to enforce corrective
mea.sures, incltiding a commitment from
them to import targeted quantities of
specific items stich as semiconductor
chips. Thtis she challenges (and, as the
president's chief economist, endangers)
inultilateialism as the process for estah-
lisliing and enforcing trade discipline.
She is an enemy of rules-based trade.
The heaw hand of American indtis-
tries is evident in Tyson's thinking, not
least in her failtire to consider that the
interventions of foreign governments
may have been foolish and otn" faihirc to
match them ma\' have been wise. The
Concorde, a commercial disaster, gets
only one mention in her book. She Fails
to probe thoroughly the story of High-
Definition Television, told by Cynthia
Beltz. ill which the Japanese government
was "proactive" but backed the wrong
(atialog) horse, while we were passive
and won by betting on the (digital) win-
ner. Clearly this is the highest profile test
case for diose in favor of selective indus-
trial policv. Its proponents clamored for
intervention: influential business, labor
and congressional leaders sent an open
letter to President Bush and Congress,
urging that the govcrni7U'nt support this
crucial technolog}, warning that our
trading rivals were already investing hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in it.
On the European ai rbus and on
Japanese semiconductors, there are
many studies now^  suggesting that gov-
ernmental support produced disadvan-
tageous results. But Tyson either ignores
them, or dismisses them summarily with
agile footnotes. The grounds on which
she rejects the ivell-known study by
Richard Baldwin and Paul Kiugman.
which concluded that the Japanese pol-
icy on semiconductors had harmed the
Japanese economy, are telling. Tyson
argues that the Japanese government's
first priority was to support and attract
the semi-conductor indtistry, rather than
to worry abottt the costs to consumer
welfare, and that in any case, thanks to
the spillo\or effects from producing
one's own chips, the disadvantages of
intervention were exaggerated.
But this will not do. Surely Tyson
wottld not want to evaluate industrial
policy in terms of industry-defined or
government-defined objectives .such
as protecting production, rewarding
friends and satisfying lobbies, without
asking whether the policy WAS socially
desirable or undesirable. .And the broad
appeal to spillovers, without any attempt
at calculating whethei- they are large
enough to offset Baldwin and Kjug-
maji's finditigs, is a irifle disappointing
in a woik that advocates a shift in our
policies on the basis of economic atiah-
sis. Tyson's attitude plays into the hands
of those who facetiotisly argue that
spillovers and externalities are the last
refuge of the scoundrel, and of others,
more cynical, who maititain that iliev are
the first.
B ut if Tyson, along with.\merican indtisuies, exag-gerates the need to matchwhat others do by mistak-
ing their occasional folly for beneficial
intervention, she is also overzealous in
emphasizing the itnportance of taking
the lead. In analyzing oligopolistic indus-
tries in which a few players compete,
economists often analyze "first mover"
advantages and the ability to make it dif-
ficult for latecomers to enter the market.
Tyson fears, for the most part, tliat for-
eign actions (for example, stibsidies)
and inactions (for example, failuie to
break up kcirelsiis) will create irreversible
first-mover advantages for foreign high-
tech (irms at the expense of American
firms. If w'e wait to negotiate agreed
rules, as at the GATT, on matters where
we have concluded that others already
may be seizing the opportunity to gain
ground, then Tyson concludes ail will be
lost. Therefore we must act unilaterally
and immediately.
Tysoti panics too much. Has .she not
heard of the "latecomer's advantage"?
Developing countrie.s in the postwar
period grew at unprecedented speed
because they increased their investment
rate, hut also because they could profit
by taking vast technological know-how
oiffthe shelf. Man\ firms leapfrog ahead
of tlie first-movers. Recent theoretical
work demonsUates the possible wisdom
of "belter late than early." Many real
world stories, carefully recorded by the
economist Michael Sherer, al.so docu-
ment how United States firms have suc-
cessfully fought back when others have
moved ahead.
THn? KTiTUf
Tyson's polity prescriptions ;ire
nonctlieless in tune with the petulance
that attends the "diminished giant syn-
drome" as we face the compeiition IVorn
the Pacific; the su.spicion that they are
gaining thanks [o unfair ti'ade practices
is hard to dispel, even to moderate. Her
positions also dovetail nicely with the
inclination to interventionism that
attends decllnisin. The great economic
historian Alexander (ierschenkron once
observed that state interventionism in-
creases the more you aix' beliind.
Declinism fits the pattern: the fear of
falling behind strengthens the visible
hand as much as the reality of being
behind.
In a declinist ethos, moreover, corpo-
rate interests become important bedfel-
lows of the proponents of the general
interest. Though John Kenneth Gal-
braith exaggerated in saying that what
was good for General Motors was (neces-
sarily) had for ihe United States, it is no
exaggeration to nt)ie that much of the
country is now in a mood to assert ibc
opposite, thai what is good tor General
Motors is (necessarily) good for the
United States. Thus have panic and
petulance, ideology and interests com-
bined to make Tyson the woman for this
season. A long, northern winter is on iis
way.
C.WATI is Aithur Lehman Pro-
fessor of Economics at CoUnnbia Univer-
sity and the Fxonomic Policy Adviser to
the Director General, G,\yi.
Connoisseur Abroad
BYE.V . THAW
Splendid Legacy: The Havemeyer Collection
(Metropolitan Museum of Art, catalog 432 pp., $65, S45 paper; exhibit open March 27-lune 20,19931
T he Metropolitan Museumis now a litiJe like a mallfilled with designer bou-liqncs, Wings are variously
named Lehman, TLscli, Wallace. Astor,
Sackler, Kiavis and so on. In ihe case of
Lehman, the naming commemorates
the bequest of a major collection, under
the condition that the musenm build
and pay foi^  a completely separate wing.
The other names commemorate cash
gifts or pledges toward the cost of bricks
and mortar. But until just recently, when
her vast collection went on display, you
couldn't find Mrs. Henry O. Have-
meyer's name emblazoned in big type
anywhere.
When she died in 1929, Mrs. Mavc-
meyer bequeathed a large and choice
selection ol her vast collection—oriental
art, decorative arts. Old Master paint-
ings and above all nineteenth-century
French masterworks, including the
world's largest and finest accumulation
of paintings and sculptures by Degas.
Bui her bequest was made in a rare
spirit. It was her particularly enlightened
and intelligent choice that her art pos-
sessions {the impttrtancc and the qitality
of which she understood as well as any-
one) should fit in wlierc iht-y liclonged
in a large, encyclopedic museum. In a
letter to her children askhig their help
in seeing her hequest properly carried
out as a memorial to Lheir father, she
wrote:
\ have made very few stipulations in my will
in I egard lo the placing or care of the col-
k'ttion bc'taiise I beiievc ihere are those
who arc iis iniclli|iffnt and as imerested as I
in Ihe cai'f and conservation ol'a valuable
faitli in the good offices of a
niu.seum! And what an absence of ego or
any attempL at control beyond the grave.
Lticky thing she did not li\e into the Hov-
ing era at the Met. when Manet's "Boy
with a Sword." a picture ihai she and her
husband deeply regrettfd uoL having in
their own collection, was slated for deac-
cessioning like so many others, and was
only saved by a last minute barrage of
publicit).
Yet the great Havemeyer exhibition
now on view at the museum, with its fai
catalog, vindicates her laith. fhe whole
collection was exhibited briefly in I9:W,
in a temporary memorial show that had
only a checklist for a catalog and virtu-
ally no illustraiions or accompanying
information. After that, the piciures,
objects, porcelain, glass, prints, drawings
and sculptures were integrated into their
respective cinatorial departments at tin.-
Mel. never tn he reassembled or pub-
lished properly until now.
.\s a young, unmiuiied woman on her
fust trip to Paris in 1874, Louisinc Elder
met die American painter Mary Cassatt.
who had ai'rived there ahout a year ear-
lier. Their friendship grew, and shortly
afterward, with Cassatt's advice and her
own saved money, she bought a Degas
ballet scene and a Monel, both consid-
ered then to be the cutting edge of
modernity. {These were possibly the first
paintings by each artist to reach Amer-
ica.) Later, having become a friend and
a patron of Degas, she learned that her
purchase had come at a moment of
financial stress for the artist. In other
contexts the story falsely turned Into the
myth [hat Degas, but Utv her timely pui-
chase, was aboui to give up pain Ling.
In 1883 Ltjuisine [narried Henry O.
Havemeyer, the scion of a family that
had long been in the sugar business. He
prospered mightily, creating the Sugar
Trust, one of the great nineteenth-
century business combines that so exer-
cised our lawmakets and prosecutors
around the turn of the cenmi y. Harry, as
he was called, must have had AU eye for
art also, since he had begun to acquire
Japanese textiles well before courting his
wife. But together, as the fortune grew,
they pursued their great collecting
adventure in a remarkable, very Ameri-
can, yet curiously sophisticated way.
I t was an age of Robber Baronsand viruially no taxes and,thanks to a combination ofcultural insecurity (vis-a-vis
Europe) and arrogance, it was a great
age of American art collecting. Bernard
Berensoii had not yet reached his zenith
of influence, biu rich Ajnericans were
nevertheless in pursuit of certified Old
Masters. Mosdy thai meant, even then.
Italian Renaissance paintings, English
portraits and an occasional Rembrandt,
for emotional depth. Those with a pen-
chant for more recent art, but art also
certified b\ the consensus of accepted
good taste, bought the Barbizon
painters: Millet, Diaz, T. Rous.seau,
Dauhiguy and of course Coiot, the
.\inerican all-time favorite {of whom it
was later said tliai he painted 2,000 pic-
tures of which 6,000 are in America
alone).
Before and after his marriage, HemV
Havemeyer showed an inclination to col-
lect along this safe and accepted path.
But with Louisine's amhition to be both
more modern and more truly orjginiil,
and with the arrival in New York of
Durand-Ruel, the firm from Paris with its
roster of Impressionists, a change began
to take place. Their more daring
approach to acquisition was fvuther
encouraged by the planning and build-
ing of a Fifth Avenue mansion, 1 East
66di SUft'i. from 1888 to 1H92. The
somewhat prosaic French Renaissance
exterior was designed by the architect
Charles Haight, but the extravagant and
Sheherezade-likc interior was created by
Louis C.omfort Tiffany. It contained, as

